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 The purpose of this chapter is to consider and contextualize some early-
modern British views on the relation between physics and metaphysics—
namely in Bacon, Boyle, and Newton. I do not claim to offer a detailed 
description of their positions here. The aim is to sketch the big picture and 
try to fi nd out whether these infl uential fi gures share a common ground. 
There are good textual reasons to think that, on the one hand, Boyle’s and 
Newton’s views were framed as critical responses to Descartes’ understand-
ing of the relation. However, these responses should not be interpreted in 
the positivist guise that was long prevalent in the standard account of British 
science. The positions of Newton, Boyle, and a number of other “experi-
mental philosophers” are distinctive not so much because they reject what 
Daniel Garber 1 has labeled “ Descartes’ metaphysical physics ,” but because 
they provide an alternative conception of the intimate relation between 
physics and metaphysics, which is partly grounded in the Baconian under-
standing of the architecture of natural knowledge. This allows physics,  in 
an enlarged sense of the word , to include the metaphysical consideration of 
primary and fi nal causes, as well as  forms and essences. 
 In Descartes’ view, metaphysical considerations are prior to physical 
ones, both in a constitutive sense and in an epistemic one. Metaphysics, or 
philosophia prima , contains all the foundations of physics, 2 and the knowl-
edge of these foundations should be acquired before delving into physical 
considerations.  Philosophia prima provides, in the fi rst place, a standard 
of  certainty (the  cogito ) and a  rule of truth according to which things are 
just as our clear and distinct ideas represent them to be. Second, it furnishes 
us with a clear and distinct idea of matter as tridimensional extensional 
quantity, the parts of which (individual bodies) together with their modes 
(shapes and motions) are the primary object of physics. Third, it consid-
ers the prime source of motion, God’s effi ciency and His immutable will, 
from which the most general laws of nature—which describe the conserva-
tion and communication of motion—are safely and directly (that is  a priori ) 
deduced, together with a number of general effects concerning the general 
structure of the world and its elements. 3 Although Descartes concedes that 
a brief “history of the phenomena” is necessary to go further into physical 
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investigations, 4 and that the discovery of the specifi c mechanisms underly-
ing the more particular phenomena of nature requires that one proceeds 
through hypotheses and experimental confi rmation, he adamantly rejects 
any  early use of such an experimental method. Refi ned experiments, to one 
who is not already acquainted with fi rst principles, cannot be properly inter-
preted and are very likely to lead astray. 5 
 I want to point out two striking features in these well-known Cartesian 
conceptions. One concerns order: metaphysics is no longer the science “that 
comes after the physics” and the crowning of the whole enterprise of natural 
knowledge, as it was in the Aristotelian view; it is the science  to begin with , 
however arduous and abstract it may seem, a prime philosophy, without 
which nothing can be properly secured in the edifi ce of knowledge. The sec-
ond feature is organic continuity. In the tree of the sciences, roots and trunk 
are made of one and the same continuous substance. Metaphysical consid-
erations are not only preliminaries; they are an integral part of the physical 
enterprise. Natural philosophy is at the start, or  in principle , a  metaphysical 
physics . And this is true, whether Descartes’ metaphysical interests were 
wholly invested in the project of founding a new physics, or whether they 
were not—which is a controversial issue. 6 While these two features are 
tightly knitted in Descartes, we should bear in mind that they are in prin-
ciple independent. It would be possible for metaphysics (the knowledge of 
the primary causes, and what counts as the basic constituents of nature) to 
be an integral part of physical enquiries and yet be considered as second in 
an epistemic sense if it succeeded empirical investigation and derived from it 
its epistemic value. As we shall see, this is exactly what holds true for some 
of the leading British natural philosophers. 
 It is however customary to present the British empiricist scientifi c tradi-
tion as directly opposed to the Cartesian view of the metaphysical foun-
dations of science, not only at the methodological level but also at the 
substantive one. There are several ways of making that point, depending on 
which author one considers as primary. A Boyle-oriented perspective may 
want to express the opposition to Descartes in the contrast between “specu-
lative natural philosophy” and “experimental natural philosophy”: Des-
cartes’  metaphysical physics would be an example (among others—notably 
the scholastic physics) of an enquiry into nature that has been corrupted by 
an overconfi dence in the powers of reason and a neglect of experiments. 
That would amount to rejecting a  speculative physics and replacing it with 
an experimental one. Another way to make a strong case for the oppo-
sition is to stress the importance of Newton’s  Principia for a new defi ni-
tion and new understanding of physics as  mathematical physics . Newton’s 
carefully crafted title, “ Mathematical principles of natural philosophy ,” is 
taken here as a direct reference to and rebuttal of Descartes’ [metaphysi-
cal]  Principes de la Philosophie . Metaphysics is no longer the science which 
gives us an intuitive, self-evident access to physical principles. The defi ni-
tion of matter and space, the laws of motions, and the characterization of 
forces are not derived from our innate notions of the nature of substance 
or God, nor derived from any other metaphysical considerations, but are 
cautiously introduced in the fi rst book of the  Principia as “mathematical 
hypotheses”—that is, an initial set of defi nitions, axioms, and postulates, in 
quite the same manner as Archimedes would have done in other branches 
of rational mechanics. From such mathematical principles, one can predict 
and quantify the behavior of imagined bodies in various circumstances. The 
agreement of these predictions with experience—for example, with the way 
actual planets behave in our solar system—is what makes these mathemati-
cal principles the true principles of natural philosophy. Nothing more is to 
be wished for. So, according to this view, at no point, neither at the start nor 
at the end, does metaphysics have a role to play—mathematical principles 
are the  only principles of natural philosophy that one needs. 7 
 Finally, one may also appeal to Locke and consider his own contribution 
to epistemology as being in effect a patient dismantlement of the Cartesian 
or Cartesian-like  metaphysical physics . In the  Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding , in a well-known passage of the Epistle to the Reader, Locke 
presents himself as the “under-laborer” employed, for the sake of master-
builders such as Huygens, Boyle, or Newton, in “removing some of the 
rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.” 8 It is tempting to interpret this 
famous declaration as follows: while men such as Huygens, Boyle, or New-
ton make their positive contribution to the construction of a new physics 
purged from any metaphysical ingredients, Locke would do the dirty work, 
showing why, since our intellectual equipment is what it is, metaphysical 
physics—call it speculative physics, aprioristic physics, etc., is doomed to 
failure. 9 
 These approaches to the opposition between Descartes and the Brit-
ish on the nature of physics may be called, with some caution, positivist 
approaches, at least if the term is construed as capturing the notion that 
physical science in its mature form should be cleared of any metaphysical 
ingredients. What may perhaps lend some support to the idea that such a 
positivist view prevailed amongst these authors is the fact that they very 
seldom use the term  metaphysics . When they employ it, it is often in a pejo-
rative sense, as a synonym for what is abstruse, verbose, conceited, and 
scholastic. Thus Boyle opposes the superfl uity of “Logical and Metaphysical 
Notions and Niceties” to the solidity of “Physical Observations and Rea-
sonings.” 10 However, one should not draw conclusions too hastily. First, it 
does not seem that Descartes’ practice of  philosophia prima is the target 
of these pejorative uses. The adjective “metaphysical” is most often use to 
refer to scholastic verbosity and to either trivial or seemingly incomprehen-
sible metaphysical defi nitions, such as the defi nition of motion as “the act 
of what is potential, in so far as it is potential.” For the denunciation of 
such metaphysical niceties, it seems that the Englishmen could easily recruit 
Descartes on their side. One may even argue that it was Descartes who 
actually taught them to despise “the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, 
affected, or unintelligible terms” 11 that supposedly prevailed in scholastic 
metaphysics. Second, these semantic facts certainly show that metaphysics 
as an autonomous discipline had somehow fallen into disgrace in the sec-
ond half of the century, and this perhaps may be revealed in certain shifts 
in the academic curriculum of English universities during the time. How-
ever, this is not to say that the metaphysical enterprise as such had fallen 
into oblivion. Metaphysical pursuits could still be undertaken in other less 
discredited disciplines, such as theology, or taken afresh in other parts of 
the philosophical curriculum—namely in logic, in ethics, and of course in 
physics . As a matter of fact, the very idea that physics, understood in a 
broad sense, should incorporate at least part of the traditional metaphysical 
program had been stated and vigorously defended in Bacon. As this source 
is more likely to have been a common ground for the later British natural 
philosophers than any Cartesian or anti-Cartesian commitment, it provides 
an appropriate starting point for discussing British accounts of the relation 
between physics and metaphysics. 
 Bacon’s Metaphysical Physics 
 A description of the division and hierarchy of the sciences was to Bacon 
of central importance to his very project of “great reformation.” Indeed, 
whoever wanted to invent and advance human learning had to become 
acquainted with the true state of our knowledge, make an inventory of 
what was known and what was still unknown, and have a sense of how 
the sciences are related to one another and ordered. Bacon undertook this 
description twice: fi rst in English, in the second book  Of the Advancement 
and Profi ciency of Learning (1605), and then in the expanded Latin version 
 De Dignitate et Augmentis scientiarum (1623), which became what was 
certainly his most widely read book. 
 On the place allotted to metaphysics, the Baconian account did not 
change substantially between 1605 and 1623. Bacon considered that the old 
concept of metaphysics had to be revised, and that its place and unity had to 
be reconsidered. He was aware that such reconsideration was so drastic that 
it might have led him to change the very name of the discipline. However, 
at least in these texts, he refrained from such a change, both because of his 
respect for antiquity, 12 and, I would argue, because he thought that the very 
name metaphysics has a truth about it, insofar that it implies a strong con-
nection to physics. His redefi nition of metaphysics aimed precisely at restor-
ing this proximity to physics that the traditional discipline, as developed by 
the Aristotelians, did not refl ect suffi ciently. Bacon’s central tenet was that 
metaphysics is a part of natural philosophy and deals with natural beings 
just as specifi cally as physics and natural history do. For that reason, the 
discipline should be stripped of foreign elements that the tradition has incor-
porated into it, namely  natural theology and what Bacon called  philosophia 
prima or  summary philosophy . 
 Natural theology, the knowledge of God through His works, is no part 
of the knowledge of nature; it properly belongs to “divine philosophy” and 
aims at a (provisional) knowledge of God and helps us to shun atheism—
but it is not concerned with the elucidation of natural beings. 
 Bacon’s  philosophia prima can be defi ned as the science of “common 
notions.” It deals with the most abstract axioms that are in use in every sci-
ence, such as the axioms concerning “quantity, similitude, diversity, and the 
rest of those extern characters of things.” 13 Although his knowledge may be 
of some concern for physical and/or metaphysical enquiries, it appears no 
more specifi cally related to natural beings, than it is to  human or  divine . So 
here, it is because of its extreme generality and abstraction that  philosophia 
prima is excluded from the realm of metaphysics. 14 
 In  De Augmentis (book III, chapter IV), Bacon explains somewhat more 
specifi cally in which sense many of the traditional objects of the old “meta-
physics” should be forwarded either to  prima philosophia or to  natural 
theology : the common notions and the so-called “transcendentals” (listed 
as  Multum ,  Paucum ,  Idem ,  Diversum ,  Possibile ,  Impossibile ), which used 
to be subject matters for a general metaphysics (or what will be called later 
 ontologia ) belong only to  prima philosophia , whereas the traditional objects 
of the so-called  metaphysica specialis , such as  Deus ,  Unus ,  Bonus ,  Angelus , 
and  Spiritus are indeed the affair of natural theology. After such a severe 
trimming, metaphysics appears reduced to what should be its sole and 
unique purpose: the study of natural beings. Thus, physics and metaphysics 
belong to one and the same enterprise. They do not differ in subject matter, 
but simply in the mode of consideration: metaphysics looks at what is essen-
tial and permanent in natural beings, whereas physics deals with the more 
“transitory” and “accidental” aspects of matter and bodies. Bacon (using 
the old division of causes) also says that metaphysics is assigned to the study 
of formal and fi nal causes, whereas physics is concern with material and 
effi cient ones. Thus understood, physics and metaphysics are two connected 
parts of the “speculative” theory of nature. They both rest on natural his-
tory, and form with it the pyramid of natural knowledge: 
 For knowledges are as PYRAMIDES, whereof HISTORY is the basis: 
So of NATURAL PHILOSOPHY, the BASIS is NATURAL HISTORY: 
the STAGE next the BASIS is phisicke; the STAGE next the vertical 
point is METAPHISICKE. As for the verticall point,  Opus quod opera-
tur Deus a principio usque ad fi nem , 15 the Summary law of nature, we 
knowe not whether Mans enquirie can attain unto it. 
 ( Advancement of Learning , 85) 
 Here, speculation is the upward (preferably slow) movement along the three 
stages of the pyramid which leads from material facts of natural history to 
the disclosure of physical (effi cient) causes, from them to the apprehension of 
forms and essence, and fi nally reaches (if possible) the ultimate apex of meta-
physical enquiry (the fi nal cause of all things, or the “condensed law of nature” 
to which Bacon equates Salomon’s words:  opus quod operatur Deus a prin-
cipio usque ad fi nem (the work that God made from the beginning to the end) . 
 The contrary move, from metaphysics to physics and from physics to the dis-
covery of new facts, deeds, and useful devices, is the “operation.” Specula-
tion aims at intelligibility. Operation aims at utility.  Pace the usual Baconian 
vulgate, it is to be stressed that, to Bacon, the farther we go into speculation, 
the better we can choose our means and promote operation, and this is what 
make metaphysics an especially  useful science: 
 It [Metaphisicke] doth enfranchise the power of Man unto the greatest 
libertie and possibilitie of workes and effects. For Phisicke carrieth men in 
narrow and restrained waies, subject to many accidents and impediments, 
imitating the ordinaroe fl exuous courses of nature. But  Latæ undique sunt 
sapientibus viæ ; 16 to sapience (which was anciently defi ned to be  Rerum 
divinarum, & humanarum scientia ) there is ever a choice of Meanes. For 
Phisicall causes give light to newe invention in  Simili materia . But whoso-
ever knoweth any forme knoweth the utmost possibilitie of  superinducing
that  Nature upon  any varietie of matter ; and so is less restrained in opera-
tion, either to the  Basis of the  Matter , or the  condition of the effi cient. 
 (emphasis in original,  Advancement of Learning , 85–6) 
 In describing metaphysics, Bacon insists that it should be pursued with 
confi dence, as something that is not, as skeptics often believe, out of reach 
of the human understanding: 
 For METAPHISICKE, we have assigned unto it the enquirie of FOR-
MAL and FINAL CAUSES; which assignation, as to the former of 
them may seeme to be Nugatorie and voide, because of the received 
and inveterate Opinion, that the inquisition of Man is not competent 
to fi nde out  essentiall formes or  true differences ; of which opinion we 
will take this hold: That the invention of Formes is of al other Parts of 
Knowledge the worthiest to bee sought, if it bee Possible to be found. As 
for the possibilitie, they are ill discoverers, that thinke there is no land, 
when they can see nothing but Sea. 
 (emphasis in original,  Advancement of Learning , 83) 
 Bacon adds to this an important  proviso : we do not really want to inquire 
into the form of each natural species, because those are potentially infi nite, 
but we want to fi nd out the real alphabet out of which each one of these 
forms is made: 
 to enquire the form of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold; nay, of Water, of 
Aire, is a vaine pursuite; but to enquire the  formes of Sence, of volun-
tary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of Gravitie and Levitie, of Den-
sitie, of Tenuitie, of Heate, of Cold, & al other Natures and qualities, 
which, like an  Alphabet , are not many, & of which the essences (upheld 
by Matter) of all creatures do consist. 
 (emphasis in original,  Advancement of Learning , 84) 
 So what we have here is a limited number of primitive natures and quali-
ties whose diverse compositions make the whole of this natural world. The 
true end of Baconian metaphysics is to fi nd out these elementary natures and 
to understand what natures there are and how they interact to compose all 
the phenomenal diversity. 
 I shall not enter here in the description of how Bacon tried to imple-
ment this metaphysical program. I do not think that his undertakings on 
this score were considered successful, even by his keenest supporters in the 
second half of the century. I do think, however, that the Baconian commit-
ment to physics understood in a broader sense was still very much accepted 
and implicit in the way later experimental philosophers and British natu-
ral philosophers understood their own contribution to natural science. The 
new science of nature was called to take the place both of an actual physics 
that was still too narrow (following too closely the tortuous course of effi -
cient causes) and of an actual metaphysics, which was ill founded and badly 
defi ned. This at least is what Bacon seemed to imply in his letter to Father 
Baranzan (June 1622): 
 De metaphysica ne sis sollicitus. Nulla enim erit post veram physicam 
inventam. 
 (“As for metaphysics, you should not be concerned: it will entirely 
disappear, when true physics is invented.”) 17
 I take these words to mean not that the future would dispense altogether 
with metaphysical considerations, but rather that “true physics” will be the 
right location for them. 
 Some will fi nd that this presentation of Bacon, as an advocate for a “spec-
ulative” and even “metaphysical” physics, fl ies in the face of the common 
view according to which Bacon was promoting experimental philosophy, 
precisely against a  speculative approach to natural philosophy. As Peter 
Anstey has shown in an important paper, 18 the very word  speculative tended 
to become, in the seventeenth century, an antonym for  experimental , and 
these terms became the  actual categories in which people of the time rep-
resented their aims and battles. This might have been true for subsequent 
authors, but Bacon did not oppose the  speculative and the  experimental . The 
duality that is singled out in the passages from the  Advancement of Learn-
ing and  De Dignitate is between speculative and operative; these terms, as 
we just saw, refer to two different legitimate aims, and two opposite direc-
tions, which are found in the practice of natural experimental science. Of 
course, Bacon’s methodology, as stated for example in the  Novum Orga-
num , is full of strident warnings against what Bacon often calls the “prema-
ture fl ights” toward the more speculative parts of philosophy. This habit of 
going directly to axioms and conclusions, after considering superfi cially a 
small number of experiments, or even without any experimental grounding, 
simply on the basis of preconceived ideas or “idols”—is certainly one of the 
main obstacles on the road to true and certain induction. And this is also 
the  rashness in speculation that will be eventually labeled the “speculative” 
way of natural philosophy, of which Descartes was supposedly the very 
paradigm, and against which the whole “Bacon-faced generation” of the 
early Royal Society period unanimously objected. 
 Nonetheless, neither in Bacon nor amongst the “experimental philoso-
phers” of the Royal Society do we fi nd the idea that physics should simply 
renounce its speculative aim and content itself with operation and usage. 
It is certainly the case that many Baconians and experimental philosophers 
thought that the time of speculation had not yet arrived, that the great busi-
ness of the period was to reconstruct natural histories, and that the task of 
erecting higher superstructures was reserved for later generations of future 
philosophers. But these declarations, in addition to being sometimes rhetori-
cal and hiding a not completely blank speculative agenda, did not mean that 
understanding nature “as it is” was not considered a proper aim for physi-
cal enquiries or that practical utility was their only purpose. This should 
appear all the more true when one considers that utility itself, or in Boyle’s 
terms the “usefullness of natural philosophy,” 19 includes, as one of its most 
valuable parts, the pure benefi t that true knowledge gives to the mind that 
possesses it. 
 Metaphysical Cosmogony and Final Causes in Boyle’s 
“Corpuscularian hypothesis ” 
 Robert Boyle is certainly the paradigmatic example of an experimental phi-
losopher of the second half of the century. It could be said that, through 
his many writings and unremittent practice, he is the very one who framed 
the identity of the “experimental philosopher.” In my view, this identity is 
somewhat mixed: it involves a Cartesian ingredient as well as a Baconian 
one. On the one hand, experimental philosophers were undoubtedly true 
Baconian disciples: they shared with Bacon the view that natural philosophy 
should be reformed, and that the only way this reform was going to succeed 
was to make it start where science fi rst began, that is with sensible matters 
of facts, experiments, and natural history. On the other hand, experimental 
philosophers, no less undoubtedly, strongly felt the spell of Descartes’ grand 
idea of mechanical philosophy, the idea that all that happens in the material 
realm can be explained as the result of the mechanical operations of insen-
sible particles. They might not agree with Descartes about how one ought 
to justify this claim or how its details should be fl eshed out—they may even 
have rejected it altogether, but in some sense they all recognized its attrac-
tiveness as far as intelligibility and heuristic values were concerned. 
 These two ingredients are no doubt present in Boyle, who advocated both 
the superiority and usefulness of the “experimental (natural) philosophy” 
and the “excellency of the mechanical hypothesis,” and never found any 
contradiction in doing so. 
 Of course, Boyle was keen to distinguish his mechanical hypothesis from 
the Cartesian one both at a methodological level and in regard the very 
content of the hypothesis. Boyle has been rightly described as the “diffi dent 
naturalist,” 20 as having been extremely reluctant toward claims for evidence 
and absolute certainty in physical matters. As he writes in the  Excellency 
of Theology (1674), hinting, no doubt, at Descartes: “the most even of the 
modern Virtuosi are wont to fancy more of clearness and certainty in their 
physical Theories than a Critical Examiner will fi nd” ( The Works of Rob-
ert Boyle , 8, 66). He then explains that the premises of most theories are 
only founded on moral certainty, and so are the inferences that are taken 
from them, “as geometrical as they could be” (ibid). In his methodologi-
cal  Proemial Essay , of his  Certain Physiological Essays of 1669, Boyle 
defends the ideas that theoretical superstructures should be grounded on “a 
considerable number of experiments, in proportion to the comprehensive-
ness of the theory to be erected upon” ( The Works of Robert Boyle , vol. 2, 
14). Although this consideration applies here to local theories (particular 
mechanical explanations), there is no reason to think that it should not hold 
as well for the general one, that is, for the mechanical or “corpuscularian” 
hypothesis as such. And indeed it seems that Boyle’s very program in natu-
ral philosophy was to provide some sort of massive inductive proof of the 
mechanical hypothesis, exhibiting a large range of experiments and obser-
vations of all sorts, showing again and again how far our understanding of 
them could be enhanced when set in the general framework of the mechani-
cal hypothesis, taking only matter and motion as explanatory principles. So, 
to Boyle, the mechanical philosophy recommends itself inductively for its 
capacity to account for an increasingly wide range of phenomena. It is what 
Boyle calls its “comprehensiveness.” Each step made in advancing mechani-
cal explanations makes the general theory more plausible. But even though 
Boyle never seriously considered that another explanatory hypothesis could 
be a viable replacement candidate, the mechanical philosophy (and of course 
its metaphysical content) was deemed to remain a  hypothesis . 
 Boyle usually presents his own “Corpuscularian hypothesis” in a careful 
way, always insisting on what makes it different from the Epicurean atom-
ism on the one hand and the Cartesian mechanical hypothesis on the other. 
The three doctrines share the same basic “physical” idea, namely that what-
ever is produced in the material world is the direct effect of local motion on 
particles of matter, but they differ markedly in their underlying metaphysi-
cal premises. On the one hand, whereas Epicurean philosophers consider 
that the only reason why atoms go in such or such direction and make such 
or such composition is mere chance, Descartes and Boyle concur in assign-
ing the fi rst source of motion to God’s will and effi ciency. On the other 
hand, in Descartes, as Boyle reads him, it seems that no more is required to 
form the “system of the world” than the initial introduction into the world 
of an invariable quantity of motion, “the material parts being guided by 
their own unguided Motions to cast themselves into such a System.” Boyle 
has another view of the matter, which he expresses (for example) in the 
Excellency and Ground of the Mechanical Hypothesis . 
 But I plead onely for such a philosophy, as reaches but to things purely 
corporeal, and distinguishing between the fi rst  original of things and 
the subsequent  course of Nature , teaches, concerning the  former not 
only that God gave Motion to Matter but that in the beginning He 
so guided the various Motions of the parts of it, as to contrive them 
into the World he design’d they should compose, (furnish’d with the 
seminal principles and structures or Models of Living Creatures,) and 
establish’d those  Rules of Motion , and that order amongst things Cor-
poreal, which we are wont to call the  Laws of Nature . And having told 
this as to the  former , it may be allowed, as to the  latter to teach, That 
the Universe being once fram’d by God, and the Laws of Motion being 
setled and all upheld by His incessant concourse and general Provi-
dence, the Phaenomena of the World thus constituted, are physically 
Produced by the Mechanical affections of the parts of Matter, and what 
they operate upon one another according to Mechanical Laws. 
 (emphasis in original,  The Works of Robert Boyle , vol. 8, 104) 
 The passage is consistent with many others similar pronouncements in 
Boyle’s writings. It makes it clear that Boyle is not only committed to the 
“physical” thesis that whatever happens in the material realm is the result 
of corpuscular local motions. What he presents here in a condensed form 
is clearly a full-blown metaphysical physics, which offers the same kind of 
genetic—or, if I may say so, “cosmogonic”—intelligibility as the Cartesian 
principles of natural philosophy. As in Descartes, what is sought here is 
not only local mechanical explanations of the phenomena, but a general 
frame in which such explanations make sense and can be traced back to 
their fi rst principles. Second, in this general frame, Boyle distinguishes the 
“fi rst original of things” and the “subsequent course of nature.” Whereas 
the description of the second phase (as the effi cient course of motions ruled 
by (blind) mechanical laws and preserved by God’s continuous concurrence) 
does not depart markedly from Descartes’ views, the fi rst phase is clearly 
different: in the fi rst original of things, the fi rst phase in the history of Cre-
ation, one has to consider not only God’s effi ciency in the production of 
motion, but also his “design,” that is the ends He pursued in “directing the 
motions” of matter, arranging together the different parts of the universe, or 
following “Models” in the production of living creature of different species. 
Boyle mentions here the creation of “seminal principles,” namely the (still 
unknown) grounds for the generation of living beings, principles that were 
put in our fi rst parents and that are still acting now in the formation of each 
new living being. It seems clear that the hint here is that we need more to 
explain the living beings that simply matter and unregulated motion: some 
systems of matter must have been specifi cally organized in the beginning in 
order to allow for the generation of living Creatures and for the perpetua-
tion of seminal principles. Admitting this however does not prevent those 
specifi cally designed seminal principles to act mechanically (as if they were 
some sorts of molds) in the processes of generation during the subsequent 
course of time. 
 This signifi cant departure from Descartes amounts to a specifi c consid-
eration of  fi nal causes in the account of the creation of natural beings, and 
specifi cally the account of the creation of  species of living beings. As it turns 
out, Boyle’s most cogent consideration of the role of fi nal causes in phys-
ics, his  Disquisition about the fi nal causes of natural things , contains also 
his most explicit discussion of the disciplinary boundaries between physics 
and metaphysics and of how Boyle’s conception of them relates to those of 
Descartes. In this text, Boyle takes Descartes to task for having excluded the 
consideration of fi nal causes from physical enquiries. He considers in par-
ticular Descartes’ answer to Gassendi in the Fifth replies, wherein, without 
denying that God had specifi c wills in creating the world, he says that those 
fi nal causes are entirely hidden from us 21 and entirely foreign to the natural-
ist. Descartes reiterates the same argument in his Letter to Hyperaspistes of 
August 1641, 22 and then, most explicitly in  Principles 1.28: 
 When dealing with natural things we will then, never derive any expla-
nations from the purposes which God or nature may have had in view 
when creating them and we shall entirely banish from our philosophy 
the search for fi nal causes. We should not be so arrogant as to sup-
pose that we can share in God’s plans. We should instead consider him 
the effi cient cause of all things; and starting from the divine attributes 
which by God’s will we have some knowledge of, we shall see, with the 
aid of our God-given natural light, what conclusions should be drawn 
concerning those effects which are apparent to our senses. 23 
 So, according to Descartes, we are not to consider the ends of God in 
creating such or such sensible thing, because our physical enquiries aim 
at explaining how those things are produced by discovering the chain of 
effi cient, mechanical causes that concurred in producing the forms that we 
see. Any physical enquiry which would avail itself of teleological discourse 
would be altogether presumptuous, uncertain, anthropomorphic, and likely 
to revert to the old discarded Aristotelian view of nature, where things are 
deemed to be so and so because their production obeys some inherent form 
or  telos that determines them to be so and so. 
 Boyle’s answers to these Cartesian doctrines constitute the larger part of 
the fi rst section of the  Disquisition . In a fi rst line of argument, he refutes and 
somehow inverts the accusation of presumption. To pretend to know (some 
of) God’s ends “is not a presumption, but rather, to take notice of them is a 
Duty” ( Works of Robert Boyle , 11, 89). He then explains: 
 For there are some things in Nature so curiously contrived, and so 
exquisitely fi tted for certain Operations and Uses that it seems little less 
than Blindness in Him, that acknowledges, with the  Cartesians , a most 
wise Author of things, not to conclude that, tho’ they  may have been 
design’d for  other , and perhaps higher, Uses; yet they  were designed for 
this Use. 
 (emphasis in original,  The Works of Robert Boyle , 11, 89) 
 Boyle is clearly referring to living bodies and parts of living bodies, which 
are so exquisitely framed that it seems impossible (and somehow “blind”) to 
conceive that chance lone could have produced them. We cannot understand 
the structure of the eye without considering its use in seeing. And seeing is such 
a manifest and obvious end that it would seem absurd to think that it is not 
for us to know it, or that it lays “hidden in the abyss of the divine wisdom.” 
 A second line of argument depends on the diagnosis of why Descartes 
thought proper to exclude fi nal causes in physics. To Boyle, such exclusion 
bears on a too-narrow conception of what may count as solid reasons in 
physics. Although physics strictly conceived deals specifi cally with mechani-
cal reasons and effi cient causes, its most fundamental principles are not, on 
Descartes’ own account, strictly “physical,” as they make use of God as an 
immaterial agent: 
 I readily admit, that in Physicks we should indeed ground all things 
upon as solid reasons as may be had; But I see no necessity that those 
Reason should be always precisely Physical: especially if we be treat-
ing . . . of the  fi rst and general Causes of the world it self; from which 
Causes, I see not why the Final Causes, or Uses, that appear manifestly 
enough to have been design’d should be excluded. And to me it is not 
very material, whether or no, in Physicks or any other Discipline, a 
thing be prov’d by the peculiar Principles of that Science or Discipline; 
provided it be fi rmly proved by the common grounds of Reason. And on 
this occasion, let me observe, that the fundamental Tenents of Mr Des-
Cartes’s own philosophy are not by himself prov’d by Arguments strictly 
physical; but either by Metaphysical ones, or the more Catholick dic-
tates of Reason, or the particular testimonies of Experience. 
 (emphasis in original,  The Works of Robert Boyle , 11, 91) 
 Boyle goes on to show that God, an immaterial being, is the effi cient cause 
of motion in matter, since matter, whose essence does not include motion, 
must owe its motion to some being that is not material. 24 He also points out 
that when Descartes argues that God’s immutability proves the conserva-
tion of the same quantity of motion, he is not using “a physical argument 
strictly so called, but rather a Metaphysical one.” This of course it not an 
objection against the Cartesian proof (although Boyle, on other grounds, 
expresses some doubts about the absolute truth of the conservation thesis). 
It only shows that we should not exclude fi nal causes from physical consid-
erations in order to preserve some pretended “purity” of physics. Disciplin-
ary boundaries do not apply here; a metaphysical argument can be used in 
physics, provided that it is founded on “the common grounds of reason.” 
The point ironically has a Cartesian ring: all the sciences are one and pro-
ceed from the same natural light. Here is how Boyle puts it: 
 And to me ‘tis not very material, whether or no in Physicks or in any 
other Discipline; a thing be prov’d by the peculiar Principles of that Sci-
ence or Discipline; provided it be fi rmly proved by the common grounds 
of Reason. 
 ( The Works of Robert Boyle , 11, 91) 
 The whole discussion calls for a few conclusive remarks. First, and quite 
strikingly, Descartes is not here taken to task for having made his physics 
too metaphysical, but rather the contrary. Descartes has unduly restricted 
the scope of natural enquiry to effi cient causes. His metaphysical physics is 
all about effi ciency and divine power, but provides no room for design and 
divine wisdom. To Boyle, the (metaphysical) consideration of fi nal causes 
is necessary on two different grounds: on the one hand, it is necessary for 
the task of  physics itself, insofar as it provides an explanatory resource for 
phenomena that are manifest everywhere in nature and in which there is 
evidence of design, fi tness, and organization, especially in living beings, but 
also in the general frame and composure of the universe. In Boyle’s view, 
“unregulated mechanism” (if I may so call the blind determinism that he 
tends to attribute to Descartes) is simply unfi t for the task of accounting for 
such phenomena. On the other hand, fi nal causes are also especially impor-
tant to the physicist because they justify his calling on religious grounds. 
They make us aware of the superior wisdom, intelligence, and benevolence 
of the Creator, and the very fact that the study of nature offers a constant 
occasion for contemplating these divine attributes, and even for refi ning our 
understanding of them, is in itself a suffi cient justifi cation for the  study of 
the book of nature . 
 So Descartes, according to Boyle, has missed the role that the physicist 
could play in promoting  natural religion and refuting  atheism . And this 
failure seems to be directly correlated with Descartes’ dismissive attitude 
toward the idea that sound metaphysical conclusions may be drawn from 
the contemplation of nature. Metaphysics, for Descartes, begins in a medi-
tative conversion, in which the mind, discarding the false testimony of the 
senses, looks into itself and fi nds there the very idea of the Infi nite cause. 
In this perspective, there cannot be any empirical constraint on metaphys-
ics: neither brute sensory experience nor experiments, however numerous 
and regulated, could yield a clear and distinct idea of the essence of matter, 
and even less could they provide a clear and distinct idea of the primary 
cause of all things. This is precisely why Descartes was extremely reluctant 
toward physico-theological arguments (and indeed to my knowledge never 
used them). He avoided them not because he thought nature was the reign 
of blind fate, but rather because these arguments, grounded as they are on 
sensory experience, were deemed to remain confused and their conclusions 
uncertain. Accordingly, they should be banned if one wants to keep phys-
ics on the safe tracks of science. Boyle, for his part, saw in the Cartesian 
aspiration to absolute certainty in physical matters a form of blindness—a 
misunderstanding both of the limits of human reason and of the fact that 
physics, or natural philosophy, serves nobler ends than the mere satisfaction 
of curiosity. It is deemed to express God’s glory, to manifest His providence, 
and to contribute to disclosing what he calls “the great and universal system 
of God’s contrivances.” To achieve that objective one must engage in discus-
sions that overlap with metaphysics and religion. Boyle expresses this most 
clearly in the  Excellency of Theology : 
 But neither the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, nor that of the 
effect of power and matter and motion seem to be more than an epi-
cycle (if I may so call it) of the great and universal system of God’s 
contrivances and makes but a part of a more general theory of things, 
knowable by the light of nature, improvable by the information of scrip-
tures. So that both these doctrines, though very general, in respect to the 
subordinate parts of theology and philosophy, seem to be but members 
of the universal hypothesis, whose object I conceive to be the nature, 
counsels and works of God, as far as they are discoverable by us. 
 ( The Works of Robert Boyle , 8, 32–3) 
 Physics, or natural philosophy, gives only a partial view of the universal 
hypothesis; it is just like an epicycle, in the old astronomical systems, which 
offers only a partial representation of the movement of a planet. I take this 
comparison to mean that the same truth may be expressed in opposite, 
seemingly contradictory ways in different sciences, just as the retrograde 
motion of a planet may be represented as the effect of the composite but 
wholly compatible revolutions of several celestial circles. Similarly, apparent 
contradictions certainly may occur between physics and religion, between 
the knowledge of effi cient causes and the knowledge of fi nal causes, and 
between physics and metaphysics. But it would be foolish to think that we 
are forced to choose between these sciences and to reject one in favor of the 
other. At some level, all sciences are one and the contradictions must vanish, 
even though we might never be able in this life to understand how. 
 Newton’s Empiricized Metaphysics 
 Newton’s pronouncements on metaphysical matters are scant but quite sig-
nifi cant. A striking one from a late manuscript, which was intended for a 
revision of the General Scholium, may provide a useful starting point. Here 
is I. B. Cohen’s English translation of the passage: 25 
 What is taught in metaphysics, if it is derived from divine revelation, 
is religion; if it is derived from phaenomena through the fi ve external 
senses, it pertains to physics; if it is derived from knowledge of the 
internal actions of our mind through the sense of refl ection, it is only 
philosophy about the human mind and its ideas as internal phaenomena 
likewise pertain to physics. To dispute about the objects of ideas except 
insofar as they are phaenomena is dreaming. In all philosophy we must 
begin from phenomena and admit no principles of things, no causes, no 
explanations, except those which are established through phenomena. 
And although the whole of philosophy is not immediately evident, still 
it is better to add something to our knowledge day by day than to fi ll up 
men’s minds in advance with the preconceptions of hypotheses. 
 This text lends itself to two opposite readings. On the one hand, it may 
appear as challenging the very idea of metaphysics: that discipline is entirely 
omitted and needs to be replaced by more legitimate enterprises. This read-
ing makes sense when metaphysics is understood as a science whose main 
defi ning feature is an epistemic one. If one construes metaphysics as the 
science whose objects are addressed in a purely intellectual way (and some-
how this is indeed the Cartesian construal), then metaphysics is an awak-
ened dream, it is vain disputes about ideas or hypotheses “that fi ll up men’s 
minds.” The similarity between the two last sentences of the passage and 
other well-known methodological texts (especially the fourth  regula philos-
ophandi 26 ), sheds some light on Newton’s usual dismissive attitude toward 
hypotheses : they are not dismissed because they are probable conjectures 
or methodological tools of reasoning (since Newton in fact constantly used 
hypotheses in these senses). Rather, “hypotheses,” in the pejorative sense, 
refers to empty reasoning about pure ideas (with no reference to empirical 
content), which is especially prevalent in metaphysics. It was particularly 
apparent in Cartesian metaphysics, in which one is supposed to access, in a 
purely intellectual way, some fundamental truths about the world. 
 The second reading is more positive. If metaphysics is defi ned not by an 
epistemic trait, but rather by its subject matter (eminent objects of knowl-
edge, such as essences, forms, and primary causes), then it is not so much 
dismissed as redistributed into three distinct disciplines. Revealed religion, 
physics, and what Newton calls the “philosophy about the human mind 
and ideas” would each have a metaphysical part that is grounded on phe-
nomena. The three sciences would nevertheless be distinct because the phe-
nomenal realms on which they ground their conclusions are distinct: physics 
deals with the sensible external world, discovered to us by our fi ve senses; 
philosophy of the mind considers the internal (but no less phenomenal 
world) discovered to us by refl ection; and revealed religion also deals with 
something that is phenomenally given, and has to be read and interpreted, 
namely the Scriptures. 
 The passage is highly interesting. For one thing, it is a clear and rare 
expression of Newton’s own view of the  distributio operis that obtains in 
the intellectual world. In particular, one can recognize in Newton’s descrip-
tion of the philosophy of the human mind a clear hint of Locke’s enterprise 
in his  Essay concerning human understanding . The exploration of an inner 
fi eld of empirical phenomena, discovered through the inner sense of refl ec-
tion, may be seen here as a sort of counterpart to Newton’s own explora-
tions of the external world. As Newton points out, following a suggestion 
of Locke himself, 27 the philosophy of mind belongs to physics understood 
in a broad sense and includes among its subject matters immaterial as well 
as material natural beings. Another striking point is the vindication of the 
methodological unity of these three great provinces of human science: they 
all derive their conclusions from the phenomena. Even theology fi nds in 
the words of the Scriptures its own sort of empirical constraints: there is 
no room for dogma here, no more than there is any in physics or in the 
philosophy of the mind. Finally, and it is the main point here, all three 
disciplines may be conceived as having a metaphysical part: they are not 
only descriptive disciplines, showing how the phenomena are connected, 
but they ought to offer some basis for speculation about true essences and 
primary causes. 
 Now, if we accept this reading, the question for us is how this “meta-
physical part” could be developed in the specifi c case of physics (the science 
of bodies). I would suggest that we have two possible answers: whereas 
most of the published texts offer a rather “Boylian” or physico-theological 
answer to this question, unpublished manuscripts present a somewhat dif-
ferent and perhaps stronger version of the Newtonian metaphysical physics. 
 It would perhaps not be amiss to mention that neither the  Principia nor 
the  Opticks proved to be very hospitable places for metaphysical consid-
erations. For example, Newton deliberately suppressed any references to 
God that were still lingering in his fi rst versions of the  scholium on space. 
Newton’s aim in the  Principia was precisely circumscribed: 
 For the basic problem [ lit . the whole diffi culty] of philosophy seems to 
be to discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions, and 
then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces. 28 
 The purpose is not to fi nd out “the physical causes and sites of forces” 
( Principia , 407)—a question that Newton considers out of his scope—but 
rather to establish from phenomena the very “fact” of forces, to exhibit 
their abstract (or mathematical) structure, and fi nally show how they could 
be applied to the explanation of other phenomena. This is all the  Principia
is concerned with, and this is certainly enough of a task for one book and 
for one man. The main text of the  Opticks— whose object is not forces but 
rather  the abstract constitution of light—is similarly devoid of any explicit 
metaphysical considerations. Whatever metaphysical content is present in 
both texts, its offi cial expression arrives only at the very end and appears as 
second thoughts, queries, or appendices. 
 In the  Scholium Generale (published in the second edition of the  Prin-
cipia , 1713), Newton writes of God: “we know him by his most wise and 
excellent contrivances of things and fi nal causes.” And after a couple of 
pages about how God (“pantokrator”) exerts his dominion on the material 
world by being substantially present to it, he famously concludes: “This 
concludes the discussion of God, and to treat of God from phenomena is 
certainly a part of natural philosophy.” 29 Similarly, in two fi nal queries of 
the  Opticks , after describing phenomena that include the attraction and 
the providential disposition of organs in living beings, Newton offers a few 
considerations (including the famous reference to space as God’s sensorium) 
about how God might have formed matter at the beginning and how he is 
still present and providentially acting in the world. 
 Other interesting public pronouncements may be found in the 1692 cor-
respondence with Richard Bentley, which took place just after Boyle’s death, 
when Bentley was preparing the fi rst Boyle Lectures. 30 Bentley asked New-
ton for suggestions about how his new natural philosophy might be put to 
use for promoting natural religion against the dangers of atheism and mate-
rialism; Newton was quite keen to detail for him a few interesting examples 
of such possible uses, and to show that the disposition of planets and the 
very measure of the laws of attraction were fi t for providing the right sort 
of dwelling place for mankind, and thus could not be the result of mere 
natural causes. 31 
 These texts quite undisputedly show that the late Newton had an interest 
in metaphysical questions, especially in the kind of physico-theological con-
siderations that were so important to Boyle. These interests engaged him in 
the same sort of cosmogonic considerations that we found in Boyle: how did 
God arrange matter at the beginning? How did he dispose it in space, and to 
which ends? It may seem, however, that Newton’s Boylianism (if it may be 
so named) is still a rather superfi cial feature of his physics. Although New-
ton said to Bentley, in his fi rst letter, that he had always had an eye for the 
service that physics could do to religion, 32 Newton’s explicit considerations 
on this specifi c topic are terse, and their public expression came quite late 
in his career. All in all, the defense of natural religion does not seem to have 
been such a strong driving force behind all of Newton’s enterprises, as it was 
indeed in the works of Boyle, the “Christian virtuoso.” Newton’s interests 
in revealed theology were certainly much stronger, and it could be argued 
that they have helped to frame the actual contents of his view of God. 33 
 A good case for the thesis that Newton actually had a metaphysical phys-
ics of a stronger sort (concerned not only with the design and arrangement 
of matter but also with its creation and very essence) may be made through 
an examination of the manuscript  De Gravitatione . 34 Although the text is 
most probably 35 of an early date and was written before Newton came to 
the idea of universal gravitation, its contents are consistent with a number 
of other metaphysical hints posterior to the publication of the  Principia . 
For that reason, it cannot be considered as some kind of youthful foray into 
metaphysics, which was soon to be entirely dismissed in favor of a sounder 
and soberer approach to physics. 36 The manuscript, for the most part, is a 
dialectical discussion of central concepts of Cartesian physics, showing that 
they are mutually inconsistent and, in fact, contradicted by Descartes him-
self. It argues that it is simply impossible to assign any determined speed or 
direction to motion, if motion is defi ned, as it is in Descartes, as the transla-
tion of the body from the vicinity of one contiguous body to the vicinity of 
another. If motion is something real, we need to refer it not simply to other 
bodies, but to an immobile being, pure extension, or absolute space. This 
in turn imposes metaphysical strictures on the conception of such immobile 
space, namely the idea that it exists “without subject” and thus cannot be a 
substance or an accident of a substance. As space is the very system organiz-
ing the relation of “places” of existent beings, it should be rather conceived 
as an emanative effect (that is a necessary concomitant) of the existence of 
beings. As Newton says, “when a being is posited, space is posited” 37 and 
so an infi nite, absolute space has to be the emanative effect of the existence 
of a fi rst, eternal, infi nite being, the one that occupies all places, in all times. 
Even though the very idea of an omnipresent God might have a theological 
origin, the inferential process used in the argument has a very characteristic 
regressive or  analytical dimension. It begins with a consideration of the phe-
nomenon of motion, and it shows that in order to make coherent the vari-
ous features of this phenomenon, absolute space is needed. That conclusion 
in turn presupposes a number of other metaphysical decisions concerning 
substantiality, existence, and God’s omnipresence. So what we have here is 
indeed an upward speculative movement from the phenomena, ending in 
a consideration of the primary cause. It is not simply the logically spuri-
ous inference from effects to cause, as in the physico-theological argument. 
Rather each new step expresses the condition of the possibility, or the essen-
tial presupposition, of the preceding one. 
 The  De Gravitatione comes then to a striking discussion of how bodies 
could have been created. Again, considering that impenetrability is the phe-
nomenal datum that makes bodies differ from space, Newton offers a sort 
of metaphysical fable, in order to account for how bodies (or something 
indistinguishable from bodies) could have been created. If God had chosen 
by an act of his will to render some regions of space impenetrable (to the 
real bodies) and had decided to transfer continuously this fi eld of impen-
etrability from one part of space to another in accordance with the laws of 
the communication of motion (the ones that we know in effect to obtain 
among the phenomena), these seemingly moveable impenetrable regions of 
space would be indeed undistinguishable from “actual” bodies, at least for 
all their mechanical properties. This account of the creation of matter is 
assuredly adventurous, and it raises a number of questions that cannot be 
examined here. 38 Newton recognizes that, since God’s will is contingent, 
God could have made bodies in another manner. The discussion is presented 
only as a conjecture, set in the frame of a cosmogonic fable and concerned 
only with  quasi bodies . 39 But nevertheless, it could be argued that it is a 
discussion of how  physics drives us naturally to conceive of the essence of 
bodies and bodily interactions, and how they could, or perhaps should, be 
constituted in nature to behave in such and such a manner. Here again, the 
style of reasoning is remarkable: Newton is not trying to deduce impenetra-
bility from any innate idea of the essence of bodies, and even less the laws 
of collision from a preconceived idea of what God’s immutability amounts 
to. The impenetrability and the laws of collision are taken for granted: they 
are matters of fact provided by empirical description and rational mechan-
ics. Metaphysics enters the picture only when one asks the question: how 
could we genetically explain the fact that bodies have such or such qualities 
or obey such or such laws? What sort of essential constitution must have 
been given to them? As it appears, the answer in the  De Gravitatione draws 
heavily on God’s will and God’s continuous action, and seems to dispense 
entirely with any substantial substratum that is understood as some sort of 
elusive  materia prima in which the qualities of extension and impenetrabil-
ity inhere. As a quasi-substantial subject, space suffi ces for sustaining the 
bodily qualities that God’s will imparts to it. 40 
 In his chapter on Newton’s metaphysics, Howard Stein has suggested that 
we should take the metaphysics of the  De Gravitatione as a kind of tem-
plate for understanding the (still implicit) metaphysics of the  Principia . As 
he writes: 
 If all this is brought into relation to the metaphysical analysis in  De 
Gravitatione et aequipondio fl uidorum it implies that in creating a 
body, God, or in the constitution of a body, nature, must impose, not 
only the fi eld of impenetrability and the laws of motion appropriate 
thereto, but other fi elds as well, with their laws characterizing forces of 
interaction of the kind that have been described—which fi elds, accord-
ing to the preface to the  Principia , it becomes the presumed task of 
natural philosophy to discover. 41 
 Stein’s descriptions are certainly quite suggestive. They make Newton a 
rather radical metaphysician, for whom the basic constituents of material 
reality are not substances or accidents, but fi elds of force (that is, dispatches 
of divine will) lawfully distributed in pure space. However, I am not sure 
that such a picture could always be easily reconciled with all of Newton’s 
physical or metaphysical pronouncements. For example, in the last queries 
of the  Opticks , Newton seems to hesitate between various causal interpre-
tations of attraction. Attraction might be indeed the immediate action of 
God’s will, which keeps the planets in their orbits and creates the fi eld of 
force simply by being omnipresent to them. But it might also be operated 
through the mediation of some  active principle , of a still unknown nature, 
which permeates space and interacts with bodies in a way that is also still 
unknown to us. 
 In any case, it cannot be doubted that there was a legitimate place, in 
Newton’s eyes, for a metaphysical physics, provided that we understand 
its method in the Baconian sense—that is a physicalized metaphysics, an 
empirically constrained metaphysics of nature. As for its actual content, 
considering how scarce, terse, and sometimes cryptic the textual evidence 
is, the interpretive debate is still open and probably deemed to remain so. 
 Conclusion 
 Bacon’s original views on the metaphysics of physics, together with Des-
cartes’ principles of philosophy, set the stage for British science in the second 
half of the seventeenth century. By no means were the British philosophers 
of nature hostile in principle to the idea that physics aims at discovering 
the true constitution of matter and the fi nal cause of its arrangements. This 
speculative aim was still very much a driving force behind their devotion to 
physical investigations, together with service to natural religion and practi-
cal utility. They may have been more or less optimistic 42 about the prospect 
of such metaphysical speculations, but they never failed to recognize them 
as an integral part of their physical undertakings. 
 Descartes’ role in framing the very idea of what a modern metaphysical 
physics should be cannot be underestimated. In order to present their meta-
physical hypothesis, both Newton and Boyle borrowed from Descartes the 
device of a cosmogenetic fable. To make intelligible how things are consti-
tuted in nature, it shows how the course of effi cient causes could have made 
them, if God, rather than creating the world and the creatures in their actual 
shape (as Genesis tells us), had chosen to create some other, simpler state of 
things, together with their laws—for example, brute matter and regulated 
motion, brute matter and unregulated motion, or infi nite space and dis-
patches of God’s will. There is no need to say that for Descartes, Boyle, and 
Newton the cosmogenetic account is markedly different, but its form has an 
indisputable common stamp in all three authors. 
 This said, the Baconian strand of metaphysical physics is certainly the 
dominant feature in both Boyle’s and Newton’s accounts. Both considered 
that the metaphysical part of physical enquiries is dependent on instruc-
tions from phenomena. This shared conviction is the source of their com-
mon rejection of Descartes’ ways in metaphysics, his belief that the basic 
truths about nature were to be found in a purely intellectual way, through 
an examination of only the content of our ideas. This intellectualist bias 
was to Boyle the very reason why Descartes missed the main metaphysical 
benefi t of experimental philosophy, i.e., the disclosure of God’s wisdom and 
design through the contemplation of his works. In this, Newton certainly 
concurred, and he said so in a number of public declarations. However, his 
main motive for rejecting Descartes’ way of ideas in metaphysical physics 
seemed to have been somewhat more epistemological and somehow more 
internal to the physical project itself. Physical certainty, if any such is ever to 
be found, must be grounded on matters of facts and on the rules of induc-
tion, and certainly not on preconceived ideas of bodies, space, or even God. 
Physics, strictly conceived, aims at establishing the truth of the facts (such 
as the “fact” that matter everywhere attracts matter according to a certain 
law). In this sense, physics  stricto sensu is nothing more than a refi ned (and 
mathematically instructed) way of extending the testimony of the senses to 
a larger and richer range of phenomena. But physics, in the broad sense, 
includes  metaphysical physics , when one comes to the question of how, once 
the truth of the facts has been fully demonstrated, we ought to determine the 
meaning of our basic physical concepts (such as space, time, motion, essen-
tial qualities of matter, force) so that they may be used together consistently 
in our account of these (new) facts. Here, it seems that the metaphysical 
enquiry, however grounded on phenomena, is not so much, as it was still 
perhaps in Boyle, an inductive inference (a generalization from a large num-
ber of similar facts) or a retroductive move (such as the physico-theological 
argument concluding from the effects to the “presumed” cause). Rather, it 
assumes (at least in the example of the  De Gravitatione ) the form of  con-
ceptual analysis ; it is a regression from conditioned to condition, where each 
step is (or ought to be) a necessary one. So it seems that, when it is properly 
conducted, this way of inferring from phenomena should yield not so much 
plausible conclusions, as most certain ones. This is the kind of achievement 
that Newton (who was in this regard certainly more Cartesian than any 
other of his British contemporaries) always sought. 
 Notes 
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Press, 1992). 
 2  See Descartes to Mersenne, 11 November 1640, AT III 297–8: “je vous dirai, 
entre nous, que ces six Médtions contiennent tous les fondements de ma 
physique.” 
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été tel. Premièrement, j’ai taché de trouver en général les principes ou premières 
causes de tout ce qui est ou qui peut être dans le monde, sans rien considérer 
pour cet effet que Dieu seul qui l’a créé, ni les tirer d’ailleurs que de certaines 
semences de vérités qui sont naturellement en nos âmes. Après cela, j’ai examiné 
quels étoient les premiers et plus ordinaires effets qu’on pouvoit déduire de ces 
causes; et il me semble que par là j’ai trouvé des cieux, des astres, une terre, et 
même sur la terre de l’eau, de l’air, du feu, des minéraux, et quelques autres 
telles choses, qui sont les plus communes de toutes et les plus simples, et par 
conséquent les plus aisées à connoître ” ( Discours de la méthode , AT VI 43). 
4  “ breuem historiam praecipuorum naturae phaenomenon ,”  Principia philoso-
phiae , AT III 4. 
5  “ [J]e remarquois, touchant les expériences, qu’elles sont d’autant plus néces-
saires qu’on est plus avancé en connoissance; car, pour le commencement, il vaut 
mieux ne se servir que de celles qui se présentent d’elles-mêmes à nos sens, et que 
nous ne saurions ignorer pourvu que nous y fassions tant soit peu de réfl exion, 
que d’en chercher de plus rares et étudiées: dont la raison est que ces plus rares 
trompent souvent, lorsqu’on ne sait pas encore les causes des plus communes ” 
( Discours de la méthode , AT VI 43). 
 6  See the discussion in Denis Kambouchner,  Les Méditations Métaphysiques de 
Descartes I (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2005). 
 7  These views are well illustrated in I. B. Cohen’s classical studies of Newton’s 
Principia , for example in Cohen (1980), and the introduction to I. B. Cohen 
and G. Smith,  The Cambridge Companion to Newton (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002). See also the discussion of these views in Andrew 
Janiak,  Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
chapter 2. 
8  John Locke,  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Paul Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), The Epistle to the Reader, 10. 
9  A less positivist and more proper assessment of Locke’s views on physics, meta-
physics, and their relation to the philosophy of the mind is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Let us simply remark that Locke’s own defi nition of physics, in the 
last chapter of the  Essay , is broadened to the effect of including God and fi nite 
spirits among the objects of this science: “The knowledge of things, as they 
are in their own proper beings, their constitution, properties, and operations; 
whereby I mean not only matter and body, but spirits also, which have their 
proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This, in a little 
more enlarged sense of the word, I call  Phusike , or natural philosophy. The end 
of this is bare speculative truth” ( Essay , IV, 21, 2). 
 10  “The Origine of Formes and Qualities,” in  The Works of Robert Boyle , eds. 
Michael Hunter and John Davies (Pickering and Chatto, London, 1999), vol. 5, 
289. 
 11  Locke,  Essay , 10. 
 12  See  The Advancement of Learning , The Oxford Francis Bacon, IV, ed. M. Kier-
nan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 80–1: “ I use the word METAPHISICKE 
in a differing sense, from that, that is receyued: and in like manner I doubt not, 
but it will easilie appeare to men of judgment, that in this and other particulers, 
wheresoever my Conception & Notion may differ from the Auncient, yet I am 
studious to keep the Auncient Termes . . . I am otherwise zealous and affection-
ate to recede as little from Antiquitie, either in tearms or opinions, as may stand 
with truth and the profi cience of knowledge.” 
 13  Bacon defi nes it negatively, as “a Receptacle for All Such Profi table Observa-
tions and Axioms, as Fall Not Within the Compass of Any of the Special Parts of 
Philosophy, or Sciences, But Are More Common, and of a Higher Stage” (Bacon, 
 Advancement of Learning , 77). He also says that it is the “inquirie touching the 
operation of the Relative and adventive Characters of Essences, as Quantitie, 
Similitude, Diversitie, Possibilitie, and the rest.” (82). 
 14  It should be clear that Bacon’s  philosophia prima is not primary in the funda-
tional sense that Descartes’  prima philosophia is. It owes its precedence only to 
the fact that its results are so general that they may be applied to every science. 
But the generality of  philosophia prima concerns only the “Relative and adven-
tice Characters” of things, not their true essences. It does not seem that there 
is any necessity to know thoroughly everything that could be known concern-
ing these common accidents before coming to terms with the more particular 
sciences. This explains why the defi ciencies in  philosophia prima , noted in the 
Advancement , do not entail  ipso facto defi ciencies of the sciences that come sec-
ond in the Baconian ordering. 
 15  “The work which God works from beginning to end.” Eccles. 3:11. 
 16  “Broad are the ways on all sides to the wise.” Cf. Prov. 4:11–12. 
 17  The Works of Francis Bacon , eds. J. Spedding and al., (London: Longman, 
1857–1874), 14. 375. 
 18  Peter Anstey, “Experimental Versus Speculative Natural Philosophy,” in  the Sci-
ence of Nature in the Seventeenth Century , eds. Peter Anstey and John Schuster 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005). 
 19  Cf. Boyle,  Some Considerations touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natu-
ral Philosophy , in  The Works of Robert Boyle , vol. 3, 189 ff. 
 20  As in Rose-Mary Sergeant’s fi ne book,  The Diffi dent Naturalist, Robert Boyle 
and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
 21  See  Reply to the Fifth Objections , AT VII 375: “toutes les fi ns de Dieu sont 
toutes également cachées dans l’abîme impénétrable de sa sagesse.” 
 22  See AT III 431–2. Boyle ( Works , 11, 92), quoting the letter to Hyperaspistes 
(in Clerselier’s French translation) admits that Descartes, in this letter, is only 
opposing “the reasonings of those who think that God has no other ends in 
creating the world but that of being praised by men.” According to Descartes: 
“it would be childish and absurd for a metaphysician to assert than God as some 
vainglorious human being, had no other purpose in making the universe than to 
win men’s praise.” To Boyle however, Descartes overstates his case, and fails to 
consider our duty of praising God for his Creation. 
 23  See AT 8A 15, CSM I 202. For a balanced discussion of Descartes’ views on fi nal 
causes, see Margaret Osler,  Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 24  Of course, this “cosmological” proof of the existence of God, with which 
Boyle tends to credit Descartes, is nowhere to be found in Descartes’ work. In 
the Third Meditation, the ‘ preuve par les effets ’ was strictly restricted to the 
unique fact of which we could be absolutely certain (the fact of our own think-
ing). For all we know, motion, a sensible phenomenon, might only exist in our 
dreams. 
 25  Cf. I. B. Cohen’s Introduction to  The Principia, Mathematical Principles of Nat-
ural Philosophy , trans. I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 54. Here is the original Latin text, in  Newton’s Math-
ematical Papers , VIII 459: “ Quod in Metaphysica docetur, si a revelatione divina 
deducitur, religio est; si a Phaenomenis per sensus quincibus externos, ad Phys-
ica pertinent; si a cognitione actionum internarum mentis nostrae per sensum 
refl exionis, philosophia est de sola mente humana & ejus ideis tanquam Phaeno-
menis internis & ad Physicam item pertinet. De Idearum objectis nisi quatenus 
sunt phaenomena somnium est. In omni Philosophia incipere debemus a phae-
nomenis, & nulla admittere rerum prinicipia nullas causas nullas explicationes 
nisi quae per phaenomena stabiliuntur. Et quamvis tota philosophia non statim 
pateat, tamen satius est aliquid indies addiscere quam hypothesewn praejudicijs 
mentes hominum praeoccupare .” 
 26  Principia , book III, 796. 
 27  See the text quoted supra note 9. 
 28  Principia , Preface, 382. In the last page of the  Opticks , Newton similarly 
described the same two-stage enquiry: one part was resolutive from compound 
to ingredients, from motions to force, or from effects to their (immediate) causes, 
and one part was compositive, which goes in the other direction and extends the 
phenomenal realm of the explanation. 
 29  Principia , 943. 
 30  Under the terms of his will, Boyle endowed a series of lectures or sermons (orig-
inally eight each year) to be held at Saint Paul’s Cathedral, with the explicit 
purpose of proving “the truth of the Christian religion against infi dels, without 
descending to any controversies among Christians; and to answer new diffi cul-
ties, scruples, etc.” Richard Bentley’s  Confutation of Atheism , whose last part 
draws heavily on Newton’s answers, was the fi rst outcome of the lectures. Boyle’s 
Lecture rapidly became the main stronghold, in the early eighteenth century, for 
the defense of a latitudinarian physico-theology, against the rise of freethinking. 
See Margaret Jacob,  The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689–1720
(Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976). 
 31  The four Letters to Richard Bentley, together with the last part of Richard Bent-
ley’s  Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World (London, 
1693) are reprinted in  Isaac Newton’s Papers and Letters on Natural Philoso-
phy , eds. I-B. Cohen and R. E. Schofi eld (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1958), 279–352. 
 32  See the opening sentence of his fi rst letter, “Sir, When I wrote my Treatise about 
our System, I had an Eye upon such Principles as might work with considering 
Men, for the Belief of a Deity; nothing can rejoice me more than to fi nd it useful 
for that Purpose” ( Newton’s Papers and Letters , 280). 
 33  To some commentators, the tone of absolute certainty that Newton uses when 
he says how we should conceive of the divine attributes is more likely to have 
been derived from his own (and sometimes rather idiosyncratic) reading of the 
Scriptures than from any considerations of physical appearances, or phenomena. 
As Andrew Janiak, who defends this thesis, puts it, the conception of God found 
in Newton’s writings is entirely “immune to revision regardless of any develop-
ments within physics” ( Newton as Philosopher , 48). 
 34  De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum, in Isaac Newton, Unpublished scien-
tifi c papers of Isaac Newton , Alfred Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). We are particularly indebted here to 
the inspiring chapter of Howard Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics,” in  The Cam-
bridge companion to Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 35  According to the fi rst modern editors (Hall & Hall), the manuscript is from the 
mid-1660s. Although it has been argued since (notably by B.-J. Dobbs) that it 
comes from a later date, contemporary with the composition of the  Principia , 
the early dating remains more plausible (see the discussions in Stein, “New-
ton’s Metaphysics,” and J-A Ruffner, “Newton’s  De Gravitatione : A Review and 
Reassessment,”  Archive for History of Exact Sciences 66, no. 3 (2012): 241–64). 
 36  The ontology of space as a divine affection appears in a later manuscripts, pos-
terior to the fi rst edition of the  Principia , the manuscript has been edited and 
translated in J-E. McGuire, in “Newton on Place, Time, and God: An Unpub-
lished Source,”  British Journal for the History of Science 11 (1978): 114–29). 
According to the testimony of Pierre Coste, the translator of Locke’s  Essay , the 
account of the creation of matter that is found in  De Gravitatione was still in 
Newton’s mind at the time of his acquaintance with Locke, that is, after 1690. 
Locke cryptically refers to it in the second edition of his  Essay . See  Essai sur 
l’entendement humain , traduit par Pierre Coste, Amsterdam, 1729 (2nde éd.), 
Coste’s note to paragraph 4.10.18. 
216 Philippe Hamou
 37  Newton,  De Gravitatione , 103: “ Et hinc sequitur quod spatium sit primario 
existentis effectus emanativus, quia posito quolibet ente ponitur spatium ” “And 
hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of what primarily exist, since 
when any being is posited, space is posited” (our translation). 
 38  See the rather severe discussion in Jonathan Bennett and Peter Remnant, “How 
Matter must fi rst be made,”  Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1978): 1–11; 
and, for a qualifi ed defense of Newton’s argument, Lisa Downing, “Locke’s 
Metaphysics and Newtonian Metaphysics,” in  Newton and Empiricism , eds. 
Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 97–118. 
 39  The whole discussion, and especially this cosmogenetic fabulation (which evokes 
Descartes’ genetic way of presenting his physics in  Le Monde, l’Homme , and his 
Discourse on Method ) shows how much Descartes’ spirit and style was still pre-
sent and infl uential in the  De Gravitatione , even though the intellectualist bias 
of the Cartesian metaphysical physics was the main target of it. 
 40  See Newton,  De Gravitatione , 106–7. “ Quod ad horum entium existentiam non 
opus est ut effi ngamus aliquam substantiam non intelligibilem dari cui tanquam 
subject forma substantialis, inheareat: suffi cient extensio et actus divinae vol-
untatis. Extension vicem substantialis subjecti gerit in qua forma corporis per 
divinam voluntatem conservatur, et effectus iste divinae voluntatis est forma sive 
ratio formalis corporis denominans omnem spatii dimensionem in qua produci-
tur esse corpus .” Here is the revised version of the somewhat defective transla-
tion of this very signifi cant passage by Hall and Hall (140): “For the existence 
of these beings it is not necessary that we feign some unintelligible substance to 
exist, in which a substantial form should inhere as in a subject; extension and 
an act of divine will are enough. Extension takes the place of the substantial 
subjects in which the form of the body is conserved by the divine will. And the 
effect of this divine will is the form (or formal reason) of bodies, denominating 
every dimension of space where body is to be produced.” 
 41  Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics,” 288–9. 
 42  Even Locke, who was perhaps more pessimistic than his peers about how far we 
could make physics “scientifi c” (that is, raise it beyond the status of uncertain 
hypothesizing), still defi nes physics, not so much as a pragmatic enterprise, but 
as a “speculative” one, which aims at discovering the true constitutions of beings 
(see supra note and the reference to  Essay , 4.21). Although he often declares that 
he does not want to “meddle” with physical considerations (Essay 1.1.2), the 
 Essay , in many ways, makes room for them, at least at the level of probability, 
dealing both with the essence of the mind and that of matter. Since it shows how 
our metaphysical options are somehow constrained by the results of an empiri-
cal enquiry (the refl ective enquiry on ideas), it would not be improper to say that 
Locke’s  Essay also belongs to the Baconian tradition of “metaphysical physics” 
that has been illustrated here. 
